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Delaney Thull: Vital Nonmoral Anger 
(Under the direction of Jennifer Morton and Markus Kohl) 
 
 I argue for a vitalist view of anger, on which we accept our strong emotional experience of 
anger on nonmoral grounds. I consider the two main philosophical approaches to anger, the Stoic 
approach and the Justice approach. I argue that both approaches fail to endorse a broad enough set 
of cases of anger. We should not always avoid anger, despite the negative consequences which often 
follow it. Nor should we only permit “apt” anger, or that anger which is morally justified by some 
harm. I show that cases of nonmoral anger exist and argue that we can understand anger as an 
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1.  Introduction 
 
 When should we be angry? There are two traditions for answering this question. One, the 
Stoic tradition, advocates for eliminating anger from our emotional responses. On this view, anger is 
undesirable. It is not a helpful emotion, it often leads to harmful behavior, therefore it should be 
avoided. The moral ideal is to become a person who does not experience anger in the first place. 
The Stoic tradition fails to find a case in which anger is good or helpful and so concludes that it is 
unjustified in all cases. On the Stoic view, we should not be angry, ever.  
 The second, the Justice tradition, advocates for morally justified anger. On this view, anger is 
an essential moral response to cases of injustice, where you have been harmed in some way. Anger is 
helpful for realizing that a wrong has occurred, for effectively communicating to the offending party 
the egregious nature of the wrong, and for maintaining motivation throughout the process of 
seeking restitution. Anger is unacceptable, inappropriate, and probably harmful when it is morally 
unjustified, so it ought to be avoided in those cases where there has not been moral harm. On the 
Justice view, we should only be angry when it is morally justified. 
 Both traditions focus on establishing the value of anger solely by appeal to moral 
considerations. I argue that we should step outside of moral frameworks in order to appreciate the 
value in non-moral types of anger. We can then embrace anger as a vital sign of life. Anger is not an 
unfortunate feature of our emotions or a pesky problem in our response to the world. We should 
not spend a lifetime regretting having been angry, wondering if we should be angry, and ignoring or 
hiding when we are angry. Of course, modulating emotion is part of being human. But, we should 
not think that anger is always unacceptable, such that we must completely rid ourselves of anger. 





valuable part of being human. We can look at anger as evidence that we care about how our lives are 
going. So, when should we be angry? When we are angry!  
 First, I address the Stoic tradition, arguing that it is inhumane to require people to pursue a 
moral ideal of non-anger. Then, I address the Justice tradition, showing that defining acceptable 
anger exclusively in terms of moral frameworks leaves out non-moral cases of anger. I consider a set 
of cases where anger seems unjustified from a moral point of view, arguing that it is still appropriate 
to experience it. Finally, I offer a vitalist account of anger, where anger is recognized as a sign of 










2.  Stoic View 
 
 The Stoic view sees anger as unacceptable because of concerns which primarily have to do 
with the common consequences of anger. The Stoic view concludes that we ought to become the 
sort of people who are never angry. Later in this paper, I argue that we lose something vital when we 
require people to give up all anger. But first, in this section, I show how the Stoic view confuses 
anger itself with the harms which sometimes follow from anger. I focus on Nussbaum’s work on 
anger and resentment as a contemporary case of this neo-Stoic argument.1  
 Nussbaum offers a rousing modern critique of anger in the roles it plays in contemporary 
morality. She claims to follow in Nietzsche’s footsteps, arguing that “Nietzsche’s instincts are sound 
when he sees in prominent aspects of Judeo-Christian morality…a displaced vindictiveness and a 
concealed resentment that are pretty ungenerous and actually not so helpful in human relations.”2 
She draws on a range of philosophical sources, from Seneca the Stoic to the nonviolent activists of 
the 20th century, including Gandhi, Mandela, and King, in order to show that we must avoid anger in 
our personal lives and in politics.  
 At the core of Nussbaum’s argument is Nietzschean ressentiment.3 She argues that resentment 
is the defining feature of anger, claiming that “the idea of payback or retribution…is a conceptual 
 
1 The tradition of the Stoic view is largely focused on the harmful consequences of anger, though there are interesting 
distinctions among views focused on harmful consequences for the subject and views focusing on harmful consequences 
for others. Arguably, the Stoics as Eudaimonists focused primarily on the psychic disharmony and the resulting displeasure 
that anger causes the angry person. Whereas, by contrast, Nussbaum focuses on the political and social consequences of 
anger for others to which the angry subject relates, in addition to the harms to self. This idea about the harms of anger is 
also important in Buddhist thought. 
 
2 Martha C. Nussbaum, Anger and Forgiveness: Resentment, Generosity, Justice (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 12. 
 
3 When I refer to Nietzsche, I will use his French term, ressentiment. When I refer to Nussbaum, and to my own ideas, I 





part of anger.” She argues that resentful payback desires are always wrong because 1) causing 
vengeful harm to an offender cannot right a wrong that has already been done to a victim and 2) 
vengeance is a “down-ranking” attempt to cause someone to lose status or power, and focusing on 
status and power is likely to dangerously consume us.4 Down-ranking is the idea that you can lower 
someone’s social or material status through vengeance by causing them to have less of something 
they previously had, be it financial goods, personal happiness, or social acceptance, etc.  
 On her account of anger, being angry is experiencing resentment. Resentment is vindictive 
and vengeful. Vengefulness is harmful because it does not ultimately right wrongs and because 
focusing on the corrupting forces of status and power brings misery. So, for Nussbaum, being angry 
is harmful. 
 Her focus on status, power, and resentment strongly echoes Nietzsche’s account of the 
“revolt in slave morality,” in which the weak resent the powerful. The weak resentfully seek to 
transform the way power works by changing the standards of morality, such that the powerful are 
down-ranked in status and the weak gain status. Her critique of anger is a compelling, modern 
interpretation in the Nietzschean tradition of being suspicious about the forces of ressentiment. 
However, she merely assumes without argument that anger must in fact look like vindictive 
resentment. By looking at Nietzschean ressentiment, I argue that resentment is not definitional of 
 
fear, anger, cowardice, hostility, aggression, cruelty, sadism, envy, jealousy, guilt, self-loathing, hypocrisy and self-
deception.” As a reactive attitude, ressentiment includes elements of both anger and resentment. Alec Walen, “Retributive 
Justice,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta, n.d., 
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2021/entries/justice-retributive/.  
 For Nietzsche, ressentiment is not something which is the same as anger, nor is it something which follows from 
anger. Rather it carries social and political weight as an the expression of “the moralizing revenge of the powerless.” 
Cressida Heyes, “Identity Politics,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta, n.d., 
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2020/entries/identity-politics/.  
 Nussbaum does not see how ressentiment is different from anger and that both are different from resentment. I 
follow her stead in discussing anger and resentment, though I argue that they are separate psychological experiences 
from each other. Looking at Nietzschean ressentiment allows me to argue that resentment does not necessarily follow 
anger, and that both emotions are separate components of ressentiment. 
 





anger. Resentment and anger are separate psychological experiences. Sometimes anger leads to 
resentment, but not always.  
 Defining anger in terms of resentment, or the payback wish, means that Nussbaum fails to 
appreciate the ways in which anger is a vital part of human experience, distinct from resentment. 
Based on her critique of anger, Nussbaum concludes that we ought to seek to do away with anger as 
a motivation in our public institutions, and we ought to seek to train ourselves away from anger in 
our personal lives. Citing the examples of Gandhi, Mandela, and King, she claims that we ought to 
adopt Stoic practices of self-examination in order to find ways to train ourselves out of experiencing 
anger in the first place. She does not simply call for nonviolence, rather she calls for non-anger.5 
When we do experience anger, she advocates that we move past it quickly, setting aside wishes for 
revenge and undergoing a Transition, so that we can be forward-looking justice seekers, who use 
problem-solving to find resolutions for anger-provoking situations.6  
 Her call for non-anger is misguided, because she merely assumes that all anger will have the 
vindictive character of resentment. Resentment might develop after an experience of anger, but it is 
neither anger itself nor is it guaranteed to develop after all experiences of anger. First, I’ll explain 
why her reading of Nietzsche is incomplete, leading her to conflate his thoughts on ressentiment with 
her ideas about anger itself. And second, I’ll describe how anger is separate from what follows from 
it.  
 Looking back at Nietzsche can show us how anger is a separate philosophical concept and a 
separate psychological experience from ressentiment. I argue that Nietzsche gives us a way to think 
 
5 Arguably, these non-violent activists were not in the business of telling people not to be angry. Their political and 
social messages focused on how to act in the world in the face of injustice. Nussbaum claims that their nonviolence was 
enabled by their deep overcoming of the impulse towards anger, but this is debatable. Nussbaum, 218. 
 





about anger as a valuable part of the human emotional experience that does not necessarily lead to 
“poisonous” ends. I draw on passages from the Genealogy of Morals to sketch his view. 
 Central to his social critique is the contrast he draws between two sets of moral values, those 
of the more primitive, older “master” morality and those of “slave” morality. On his account in the 
Genealogy of Morals, master morality consists of the “knightly-aristocratic value judgements [which] 
presupposed a powerful physicality, a flourishing, abundant, even overflowing health, together with 
that which serves to preserve it: war, adventure, hunting, dancing, war games, and in general all that 
involves vigorous, free, joyful activity.”7 Under a politico-social regime of this master morality, 
ressentiment emerges as a vengeful response of those with less power.  
 Nietzsche explains that in the cultures where there is a powerful, ruling caste, there are those 
who are not powerful, who stand in “jealous opposition.” He details how “it is because of their 
impotence that in them hatred grows to monstrous and uncanny proportions, to the most spiritual 
and poisonous kind of hatred.”8 He claims that this “most spiritual revenge” (italics his) resulted in “the 
slave revolt in morality” (italics his) which successfully overturned master morality and has remained 
“victorious” as the driving moral force for the past 2000 years.9 He identifies the huge triumph of 
slave morality: that we lost the fear of man when we undermined the traditional modes of strength 
and power.10  However, Nietzsche worries that the cost of losing the fear of man, or losing respect 
 
7 Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, Basic Writings of Nietzsche, trans. Walter Arnold Kaufmann, Modern Library ed (New 
York: Modern Library, 2000), 469. 
 
8 Nietzsche, 469. 
 
9 Nietzsche, 470. 
 
10 And he acknowledges that there is merit to this: “one might be quite justified in continuing to fear the blond beast at 
the core of all noble races and in being on one’s guard against it.” Nietzsche, 479. Nussbaum reads Nietzsche as not 
entirely rejecting the new Judeo-Christian moral reality. She writes, “far from holding that moral heedlessness is good 
and Christian ethics inferior, he holds that Christianity was necessary in order “to breed an animal with a right to make 
promises,” and thus an important ingredient of the good person, even if inadequate on its own.” Nussbaum, Anger and 
Forgiveness, 74. However, that seems to be a misunderstanding. For Nietzsche, what bred the animal with the right to 





for strength and power, is a creeping mediocrity among all humans, or “the diminution and leveling” 
of what is great about mankind.11 And even more strongly, he says that where there is nothing more 
to fear there is also nothing left to admire or love, because the strength and power we fear are also 
the forces which produce greatness.12 
 He claims that this leveling down to mediocrity happens because the morality of ressentiment 
is characterized by reaction, passivity, and cleverness. For Nietzsche, ressentiment is “fundamentally 
reaction,” where “true reaction, that of deeds” is abandoned in favor of “an imaginary revenge.” 
Instead of concretely acting upon the world and shaping it actively, the response of ressentiment is to 
reject all that is “not itself” as that which comes from an “hostile external world,” meaning that 
ressentiment is an all-consuming view, where any information that contradicts the experience of 
ressentiment is hostile and cannot be trusted.13 So, instead of taking action, the reaction of ressentiment is 
to form and reinforce an attitude of suspicion and rejection. Reaction without deeds looks like 
developing a worldview through which you see all your experiences through the lens of ressentiment. 
Ressentiment is characterized by stewing over your circumstances and perceiving life as hostile to you. 
 Second, he argues that the source of happiness is each different for master and slave 
morality because the vibrant, powerful noble men are happy without question when they are in 
action. They do not have to persuade themselves of their happiness. Whereas those fueled by 
ressentiment seek “rest” and “peace,” achieved by “establish[ing] their happiness artificially by 
examining their enemies.”14 The happiness of ressentiment comes from moral self-aggrandizement, 
where you think yourself to be better than others. 
 
11 Nietzsche, Basic Writings of Nietzsche, 479–80. 
 
12 Nietzsche, 480. 
 
13 Nietzsche, 472–73. 
 





 And third, Nietzsche argues that ressentiment is characterized by cleverness, which draws a 
contrast between an over-thinking, calculated approach to life, and an approach of openness and 
forthrightness.15 Living according to ressentiment means you know “how not to forget, how to wait, 
how to be provisionally self-deprecating and humble,” in order to pursue your ultimate goal of 
undermining your enemy. Instead of speaking up and taking action, you save up a catalog of slights 
and wrongs and dream about how you will eventually address them all. Ressentiment is about 
scheming, where your life is about pursuing your own agenda of vengeance, such that your other 
actions are in service of it.  
 On Nietzsche’s account, ressentiment is a reactionary response to an experience of anger. 
Anger, and strong emotion generally, can be experienced by anyone, but in some people, anger turns 
towards resentment and in others anger is dealt with swiftly. For Nietzsche, anger and resentment 
are part of the ingredients for ressentiment, for those who are weak.16 But, resentment is not a 
necessary consequence of anger in all cases. Rather, Nietzsche claims that ressentiment is a 
consequence of the weakness of those who focus on their social standing in relation to people with 
more power.  
 Nussbaum and the Stoic tradition generally argue that anger is to be avoided in all cases 
because it inevitably leads to the harmful effects of resentment, like vengeance, or emotional 
bitterness, or long-term psychological turmoil. The harmful effects she is worried about can be 
 
15 Nietzsche, 474. 
 
16 I think anger is the same mental state, or psychological and physiological experience, for both the weak and the strong 
on Nietzsche’s account, and that the weak process anger differently than the strong. However, you might also think that 
the initial experience of anger is different for those already in the grip of ressentiment. In reactionary persons, the first 
reaction of anger might already be resentment-laden before it is even processed. Even if some story about how we could 
train our emotions in certain directions can be told to show that the anger of those experiencing ressentiment is 
resentment, in a more immediate sense like Nussbaum argues, there are still plenty of reasons to think that not all anger 
is in fact like that. There likely are people who do not experience anger and resentment through the lens of ressentiment 
and, as I’ll develop in the paper, there are instances of anger which do not conform to the boundaries for suitable 





characterized as resentment, as something which can follow from anger, but which is not guaranteed 
to follow from anger. And neither resentment nor anger is the same as full-blown ressentiment. 
Nussbaum is wrong to conflate anger with Nietzschean ressentiment, and wrong to conclude that 
ressentiment, socially-informed vindictiveness, is the same as resentment, a more general vindictive 
attitude. I argue for a causal structure where anger can lead to resentment, especially anger that is 
held back and repressed. 
 Here is an account of anger which separates the emotion from its aftereffects. We can 
understand anger as an emotional experience with psychological and physiological components. 
Psychologically, anger is an affective experience, or something we call a feeling, which follows some 
recognition or awareness about something anger-inducing in the world. Physiologically, there are a 
cluster of identifying emotional features which can go with anger, including neurophysiological 
symptoms, behavior like certain facial expressions.17  
 On this view, it might seem as if anger is merely something that happens to you and which is 
totally out of your control. I think often that is how anger feels. It comes upon us quickly and 
suddenly. However, it is not the case that we are completely unable to shape our capacity for anger 
or control our response to it. Nussbaum discusses moral exemplars who she thinks were able to 
become less angry people.18 And, we can think about cases where we might call up our anger, like 
when a coach tries to call up anger in his sports team at the memory of a harsh loss to a rival, in 
order to stoke up motivation for vengeance. So we clearly have some capacity for shaping our 
emotional experiences. 
 
17 Robert C Solomon, “The Philosophy of Emotions,” in Handbook of Emotions, ed. Michael Lewis, Jeannette M. 
Haviland-Jones, and Lisa Feldman Barrett, 3rd ed (New York: Guilford Press, 2008), 11–12. 
 






 We might think of it in a parallel to how we can exert some control over our beliefs. There 
are things we can do to shape our beliefs and to be responsible epistemically about how our beliefs 
are formed, even though we cannot directly control the content of our beliefs.19 So too with 
emotions. We can form our character in certain ways or place ourselves in certain situations to exert 
indirect control over our emotions, even as we cannot reliably have direct control over whether or 
not we actually have a certain emotional experience.20 Even as we recognize that we can influence 
how often or how intensely we have emotional experiences, we can still understand our emotions as 
psychological and physiological experiences that come upon us.21 
 Though I argued that we ought not to conflate anger with its potential aftereffects of 
resentment, it is important to take seriously the concerns raised by Nussbaum and others about 
anger’s harms. You might be consequentially concerned about the effects of anger for moral reasons 
 
19 Chignell describes prudential, moral, and epistemic norms which guide belief formation, suggesting that we have some 
control over and responsibility for the things we come to believe because of how we can shape our practices of inquiry. 
James’ classic claim about this phenomenon is that sometimes “faith in a fact can help create the fact,” meaning that 
there are cases where believing that p helps to make p true. Andrew Chignell, “The Ethics of Belief,” in The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta, Spring 2018 (Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2018), 
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/ethics-belief/; William James, “The Will to Believe Essays,” Will to 
Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy 1 (1897): 25. 
 
20 In a simple sense, you might watch a sad movie to allow yourself to feel sad and cry, you might go to a comedy show 
to help yourself to feel happy and to laugh, or you might set up a romantic dinner to facilitate feelings of love and desire. 
The emotion is still something that happens to you, though you knowingly put yourself in an environment most likely to 
facilitate an experience of the emotion. More complexly, you might pursue a project of mindfulness or meditation to 
shape your control over your emotions. Or, you might come to understand that some expressions of strong emotion, 
like yelling when you are angry, are not welcome in certain spaces, so you learn not to use those expressions. Srinivasan 
calls such projects of shaping our fundamental emotional responses “affective retraining. ”Amia Srinivasan, “The 
Aptness of Anger,” Journal of Political Philosophy 26, no. 2 (June 2018): 139, https://doi.org/10.1111/jopp.12130. 
 
21 The idea that we can be morally responsible for our anger or for our other emotions requires that we have at least 
some control over them. I think we do have at least some, though whether we should have to consciously activate that 
control is a matter for debate. For Nietzsche, a dichotomy between active control over emotion and passive experiences 
of it would not be suitable for describing how a ‘strong’ individual with genuine self-mastery feels anger. He might think 
that a model on which one needs to exert indirect control over emotions to make them permissible already implies a 
sense of estrangement or alienation from these emotions. For Nietzsche, a person with true self-mastery is so in tune 
with his affects that the emotions are experienced from the very onset as warranted, valuable, fitting, etc. When I give 
my view of the vitalist account of anger, I’ll suggest that embracing anger’s non-moral value allows us to set aside 
thought about this dichotomy altogether. A vitalist might spend time thinking about how to respond to her anger, but 
she will not be worried about whether or not she ought to be experiencing it in the first place. Even if she could exert 





or prudential reasons. First, moral reasons occur when we notice that wrongdoing often follows an 
experience of anger. When you lash out from anger, often you act in a way that harms another 
person. You might say unkind and hurtful words, you might physically hurt someone, or you might 
take action to interrupt or thwart someone’s plans or projects. Nussbaum sees resentment as the 
sort of thing that leads to acts of vengeance and violence, so she concludes that anger is morally 
unacceptable.  
 I point out that these moral harms sometimes follow from anger, but it is not the case that 
anger always leads to violence or harm. There might indeed be a significant connection between 
being angry and acting in a harmful way. Nussbaum and the Stoic tradition see this connection and 
claim that we should never be angry because it so likely leads to wrong action, either that harms 
ourselves or others.22 I argue that rather than focusing on not being angry in the first place, we 
should focus on not acting wrongly when we are angry. Avoiding harm to ourselves and others does 
not look like total repression of anger, however. In the vitalist account I’ll give, expressing anger well 
is a key part of experiencing it as a valuable part of life.  
 Of course, it might be empirically possible to find out just how strong the connection 
between anger and harmful action is. If anger in most cases leads to wrong harms, then perhaps the 
most efficient way to prevent such harms is to refrain from anger in the first place. However, I will 
argue later in the paper that the call to never be angry is misguided and asks something inhumane of 
us because there are reasons to think that anger is a meaningful part of human life.  
 Aristotle and Nussbaum hold that a desire for vengeance or a “payback wish” is definitional 
for anger.23 However, Srinivasan points out that often our anger comes with a desire for recognition, 
 
22 Nussbaum is primarily focused on moral harms to others, though the ancient Stoics would have seen psychic harms to 
self as a moral concern as well, given their eudaimonist view. I discuss these harms to self as prudential reasons to be 
worried about anger (i.e. it can be psychologically exhausting), but the broader idea of identifying them as a concern 
holds either way. 
  





not for revenge, where we want someone to realize that we are hurting, without wishing to directly 
inflict the same hurt on them or wishing to see them indirectly suffer in some way.24 I point out that 
the desire for revenge arises after thinking over the circumstances that caused the anger in the first 
place. Arguably, settling on the idea of revenge after an experience of anger is a feature of 
developing resentment. Resentment itself is thus an effect of dwelling on an experience of anger. 
Resentment develops over time, after experiencing anger, if the anger is not appropriately responded 
to. If anger does not have an outlet, it can lead to resentful self-aggrandizement, stewing, and 
scheming to develop revenge. Nussbaum is thus rightly worried about the moral harms which can 
follow from resentment. But the answer is not to seek non-anger. Rather, it is to handle anger 
appropriately before it can turn into harmful resentment. Resentment, therefore, is not central to or 
definitional for anger. The moral reasons to worry about anger are actually reasons to worry about 
resentment.  
 I’ve shown that moral reasons to avoid anger incorrectly assume that anger directly causes 
harms. The Stoic tradition might respond that even if anger is not a moral concern in all cases, it 
might nonetheless be worth avoiding because of prudential reasons. Prudential reasons to be 
concerned about anger include worries about how it affects us. You might think that too much 
anger is bad for us practically. It might take up a lot of emotional energy, it might create an 
unhealthy physiological strain on our bodies in the same way that stress does, or it might lead to 
patterns of thought that are dark and destructive. Being perceived as angry in the public square 
might have counterproductive political consequences.25 You might lose your job or face discipline in 
a school setting if you cannot express your anger in a socially acceptable way, or in a way that avoids 
harm to your colleagues or classmates. Colloquially, we have a whole field of therapy dedicated to 
 
24 Srinivasan, “The Aptness of Anger,” 129. 
 





anger management techniques, which suggests that there are good reasons to worry about the 
impact of anger on our minds and bodies, in addition to the way it can lead to harmful actions and 
negative impacts on others.  
 Even if we set aside the debate about whether anger is always morally harmful, we might yet 
have these kinds of prudential reasons to avoid anger. However, I’ll respond to the Stoic view later 
in the paper by arguing for a vitalist account of why anger actually has a positive quality. And, I’ll 
suggest that avoiding resentment will help prevent most of the prudentially concerning situations. 
For now, I’ll turn to another response to the Stoic tradition, the Justice view, which argues that 











3.  Justice View 
 
 Before I give my account of acceptable non-moral anger, I’ll first address the predominant 
approach to arguing in favor of anger, which I call the Justice view. The Justice view on anger insists 
that some anger is acceptable after all, so long as it is morally justified. There are different accounts 
of how to morally justify anger, but the general line of argument holds that anger is an appropriate 
response when you have experienced some kind of wronging.26 Accounts emphasize that justifiable 
anger needs an object: you need to be angry at someone.27 At its strongest, this view insists that in 
certain cases it would be wrong not to be angry because anger is such a strong and important moral 
reaction.28 Anger might have a justifying social role by doing important communicative work to 
show other people the boundaries of acceptable behavior.29 And, anger might have an expressive 
role for yourself that allows you to preserve your internal moral coherence by bringing the outside 
 
26 Strawson saw emotions, including anger, as being our key method for moral accountability. P. F. Strawson, Freedom and 
Resentment, and Other Essays (London: Methuen [distributed in the USA by Harper & Row, Barnes & Noble Import 
Division, 1974). Callard shows how even grudge-holding and revenge-seeking can be seen as moral actions in response 
to a moral harm. Agnes Callard, “On Anger,” Boston Review (Somerville, United States: Boston Critic, Incorporated, 
2020). 
 
27 Solomon points out such a moment in Rhetoric, when Aristotle claims “that ‘anger is always directed toward someone 
in particular, for example, Cleon, and not toward all of humanity.’” Solomon, “The Philosophy of Emotions,” 5.  
 
28 Again, Solomon on Aristotle is helpful: Aristotle “also insisted that only fools don’t get angry, and that although overly 
angry people may be ‘unbearable,’ the absence of anger (aimed at the right offenses) is a vice rather than a virtue. In this 
as in all else, Aristotle defended moderation, the ‘mean between the extremes.’” Solomon, 5. Also, Cherry gives an 
account of anger as compatible with agape love, where agape love is a universalizing concern for the wellbeing of those in 
your community. On her account, one way to show love is through being angry when hateful attacks are made on your 
community. Myisha Cherry, “Love, Anger, and Racial Injustice,” in The Routledge Handbook of Love in Philosophy 
(Routledge, 2019), 600. The general idea is that considering others to be our moral equals means that we are sometimes 
required to be angry on their behalf. If you are not angry when you should be, because you think yourself to be above 
the fray in some way, then you signal to others that the moral harm means nothing. 
 






world into awareness of your experience of harm, or by raising your own awareness of your 
oppressed or harmed condition.30 On the Justice view taken broadly, anger is acceptable when it is 
morally justified by some harm. 
 Consider an example of justified anger. If you are dining outdoors in a sidewalk cafe and 
have just been served your order of crispy, salty truffle fries, it would be very wrong for a stranger 
on the sidewalk to snag a handful off your plate as he walks by. This would be stealing. The harm 
would be the theft of your fries and the object of your anger would be the stranger who stole them. 
A legitimate moral violation happened, and your anger justifiably reflects that harm. You might have 
an angry expression, or say some angry words, communicating to the fry snagger that his behavior is 
unacceptable and to those around you to watch out, because harms are underway.  
 Srinivasan’s work on anger is a good illustration of how the contemporary Justice view 
would regard this as a case of justified anger. For Srinivasan, “apt” anger is the only acceptable anger 
and it requires some instance of moral harm. She argues, “since anger presents its object as involving 
a moral violation, one’s anger that p is apt only if p constitutes a genuine moral violation. If I am 
angry that you didn’t come to the party but your not coming to the party constitutes no moral 
violation, then my anger is hardly fitting.”31 She details how apt anger requires “reasons to be angry” 
and must be a “fitting response” to the situation.32 These conditions for apt anger imply that anger 
outside of this moral framework is wrong. In the case of the fry-stealing stranger, your anger is “apt” 
because a genuine moral harm occurred.  
 
30 Srinivasan suggests anger might have “salutary psychic possibilities for someone whose self-conception has been 
shaped by degradation and hatred.” Srinivasan, 126. 
 
31 She allows that apt anger might also result from a normative harm, like in the case of a violation of some epistemic 
norm. Srinivasan, 129. 
 
32 The anger must be for a personally known reason, be motivated by a related reason, and display a proportionate 





 Imagine a more complex story emerges, however. Perhaps the waiter lets you know that 
there is some explanation for excusing the behavior. Perhaps the fry snagger has a developmental 
disorder or a mental health condition that can explain the erratic behavior. The restaurant workers 
recognize the man and explain that the manager is working with his caregivers to figure out a 
solution. They apologize, comp your fries, and bring you a fresh order. While fry snagging is of 
course generally wrong, the Justice view would respond that your anger response is not justified if 
the man is not blameworthy. Your anger is not “apt.” On the Justice view, it would be morally 
wrong for you to remain angry once you learn about the situation. 33  
 Most interestingly, on the Justice view, it was wrong to be angry with him in the first place. I 
agree that it might not be appropriate to remain angry once you learn about the situation, in part 
because my vitalist account of anger advocates not dwelling long on anger in any case. However, I 
think your initial anger was completely fine because you care about living a life without being 
harmed by others. Srinivasan holds that in a case of mistaken moral harm like this one, anger is not 
“fitting” at all, though it might be “excused but inapt.”34 Srinivasan explains that she would modify 
her initial assessment of the anger’s “aptness” in light of learning the new information, but I think 
this stance denies how anger is a vital response to life.  
 The Justice view uses moral reasoning to address a large set of cases. However, the Justice 
view does not give a satisfactory account of cases of anger that fail to meet the demands of moral 
justification. I propose that there are many more instances of acceptable anger than just those cases 
of “apt” anger. In other words, the set of acceptable cases of anger is larger than the set of cases of 
morally justified anger. I refer to “acceptable” cases in this paper to describe anger which we should 
 
33 There are differing accounts within the Justice tradition about why this anger would be morally wrong. Some reasons 
include that you risk causing harm to the man by acting against him in anger, or you do psychic violence to yourself by 
maintaining anger in an inappropriate situation, or some principle is violated about refraining from anger when not 
warranted, etc. 
 





not reject, think needs to be avoided, or require justifying in moral terms.35 I think the reasons for 
accepting the sort of cases I am interested in are not moral reasons, but are distinctly non-moral.  
 Consider again our sidewalk café case. Imagine that your baby at the table with you snagged 
a handful of your fries and knocked a bunch onto the ground. If you are angry, the Justice view 
would say that your anger is not justified at all. Your baby doesn’t yet have a sense of himself as 
distinct from you. Your baby is entitled to you feeding him and is too young to know the social 
conventions of asking first or to have the physical control to not be clumsy. No wrong has occurred, 
and your baby definitely is not a legitimate object for anger.  
 However, I can imagine feeling a flash of anger, even if you love your baby and you “know 
better.”36 I think this is acceptable. You might feel like these messy incidents are just a pattern of 
frustrating events that it will be impossible for mothers to escape. You might wonder, is nothing 
sacred for mothers? Can you not just order fries and have them all to yourself, undisturbed in a 
crispy pile, only to be satisfyingly dismantled by you?  
 On the Justice view, this flash of anger is wrong. Obviously, babies cannot commit moral 
harms because they are not developmentally able to have responsibility for their actions. And 
especially in a relatively trivial case like this one, the harm seems so small on the face of it. On a 
weak account of what happened, the flash of anger at your baby might be characterized as a moral 
misfire. If anger is an important moral emotion, then sometimes it might be mistakenly activated. 
You might feel like you are experiencing moral harm and be mistaken about it. On a strong account, 
 
35 I could call them “permissible” cases, but that seems to bring with it an implication of morally permissible. Some 
acceptable cases might be morally permissible on some ethical or normative frameworks, but other acceptable cases have 
to do with decidedly non-moral concerns and they would only be morally permissible if some general rule was adopted 
that accommodated their non-moral value.  
 
36 Consider also the case of parents trying to get toddlers or young children to go to sleep in the face of a litany of 
stalling tactics. Kids really cannot help the fact that bedtime is hard sometimes, and stall tactics are about communicating 
some unmet need for comfort or quality time, yet we can understand how a parent might feel a flash of anger in the face 
of repeated interruptions and bedtime refusals. You might also feel this unjustified flash of anger when your beloved pet 





you are not just making a moral mistake if you are angry. Rather, you are committing moral wrong 
of your own. In harboring unjustified anger against someone, you have done them wrong.  
 I have a strong intuition, however, that though the anger you might feel towards your baby is 
morally unjustifiable, it is not therefore unacceptable. The right way to primarily characterize that 
anger is not as a moral mistake nor as a moral harm, not because it is actually morally justified in 
some way, but because the right framework for characterizing it is non-moral. Feeling a moment of 
strong anger is acceptable. There is moral work to do in understanding anger, but it unfolds 
subsequent to the emotional experience, in seeing how you respond to your anger. The feeling itself 
is a vital part of life.  
 Perhaps for a new mother who is stretched thin, this anger at her baby indicates that she 
deeply cares about having time for herself and her own projects, and sometimes frustrating small 
incidents seem to represent a greater loss of freedom or independence. However, it would be 
obviously wrong for her to remain angry with her child, or to somehow take out anger on her child, 
or on others in the restaurant. What determines whether the mother does moral harm is not whether 
she sometimes gets angry. Rather, the thing with moral stakes is how she responds to her anger. We 
can think of her anger itself using a different framework than whether it is right or wrong. We can 
endorse the anger regardless of whether we concede that it is morally wrong. Even if we do concede 
that it is morally unjustifiable, we can still endorse it as acceptable. In other words, anger can be 
endorsed completely regardless of moral categories, as I’ll develop further. For now, my intuition 
about this case suggests that there are at least some instances of non-moral anger, which is an 
important step on the way to the stronger endorsement of anger, regardless of moral categories. 
 Rather, the mother’s anger has a non-moral quality, because it is an expression of her good 
desire for meaningful agency. Along the lines of the vitalist account I develop later in the paper, we 





autonomy. This is a trivial interaction with her child, but it is not hard to imagine that adjusting to 
life with a toddler might bring with it an entire pattern of frustrating, constraining interactions that 
seem to overtake or subsume her other projects and commitments. This anger-inducing frustration 
can be true even if she is happy to be a mother. It is good that she cares about her life, her time, and 
doing things she enjoys, and that she has a strong sense of her identity independent of her role as a 
mother. Feeling anger when these important goods are repeatedly constrained by motherhood is a 
sign that she values her own life. We can see this as a good and acceptable thing, a vital thing, even if 
it is sometimes in tension with her good feeling of valuing her child’s life. Anger she experiences is a 
vital sign that she cares deeply about meaningful things, whether or not her anger is morally justified. 
 I gave an account of the Justice view of anger, which holds that acceptable anger must be 
morally justified. I’ve developed the intuition that at least some types of anger are acceptable even if 
they are morally wrong. In the next section, I’ll give a distinction that allows us to have a non-moral 












4.  Non-moral anger  
 
 How can I explain my intuition that your morally unjustified anger towards your baby is 
acceptable on non-moral grounds? The fry snagging baby is a case of blameless-object-anger. The 
baby is the object of your anger, but he has done nothing wrong. Consider a few other cases which 
activate a similar intuition about acceptable anger: cases of frustration-anger and anger-without-
object. These are hardly a comprehensive listing of types of acceptable non-moral anger, but I 
present them in order to make the point that such a thing exists. 
 Frustration-anger happens when you grow frustrated about your circumstances, often 
through some limitation outside of your control. You might feel a flash of frustration-anger when 
your flight is canceled and you are left stranded overnight in Newark, or when you are part way 
through cooking a complicated dish and you realize that your main ingredient has turned bad, or 
when a just-rinsed clean pot slips from your hands back into the dirty water in the sink. Something 
bad has happened to you, but it is not a moral bad. The object of anger might be the airline or the 
grocer or your clumsy self, but in none of these cases is it clear that any moral harm is happening.37  
 And, anger-without-object happens when there is no one to blame.38 You might feel anger 
when you grieve the loss of your 85-year-old grandmother who died peacefully in her sleep, or when 
you receive a serious medical diagnosis as a healthy young person, or when you experience the 
 
37 Of course, if the airline deliberately sold you a ticket, knowing the flight would be cancelled and that you would be 
stranded, or if the grocer deliberately sold you expired food, then those would be moral harms. But I am thinking of the 
cases where frustrating, inconvenient things just happen in the normal course of life and no one is to blame. 
 
38 Objects of anger are certainly persons, but you might also take non-humans as objects for anger too, like animals, 
institutions, organizations, etc. You could be angry at Apple for blocking your new app from sale in the App store, for 





devastation of your neighborhood after a tornado. In these cases, you have done nothing wrong, 
you certainly do not deserve the suffering that has happened to you, and importantly, no one else 
can be blamed because no one else has done anything wrong. No one has unjustly harmed you and 
nothing is morally wrong.39  
 I think the anger in all of these cases is acceptable for non-moral reasons, even if it is not 
morally justified. I make a distinction between anger and the actions that follow from it. To fall into 
resentment in any of these cases would be wrong. You should not resent your baby, the airline, the 
grocer, your clumsy self, or the abstract forces of life circumstance. The potential for resentment in 
these cases does not, however, mean that the initial anger itself is unacceptable. It does not mean 
that you should work to become the kind of person who does not experience that anger in the first 
place, as the Stoics argue. Resentment is a response to anger, where anger has settled in and been 
allowed to stick around internally, and perhaps where certain angry actions might follow from the 
emotion. It would be wrong to lash out at your baby or a flight manager, or to let a resentful 
emotion towards them fester in you, for example, but I think feeling the anger in the first place is 
acceptable.  
 Further, though none of these cases are morally justified anger, I do not think it is right to 
say that experiencing the anger is a mistake or a wrong. It would not be appropriate to say to an 
angry person in these situations, “you should not be angry.” My vitalist view will be able to explain 
why. Once you see that anger can be acceptable on non-moral grounds, and acknowledge that there 
is still plenty of room for moral assessment of how you handle anger, then you might begin to 
 
 
39 Of course, if you believe in God, perhaps you can be angry with Him for permitting these things to happen to you. An 
explanation like this could account for our highly interpersonal sense of needing an object for our anger. In cases where 
no person has done something wrong, you might still have an object for anger in the form of supernatural persons, like 
God, the devil, or other spirits of some sort. Or, you might take some other abstract sense of the forces of Universe as 
the object of your anger. But if we don’t want to accept non-human supernatural forces as legitimate objects for our 





advocate for a moral view where all anger is not only acceptable on non-moral grounds, but is 
morally permissible because of the good of valuing our emotions. You might endorse a distinction 
between cases where the anger is morally permissible but not morally apt, and cases where it is 
morally apt. However, all I want to show with this paper is that anger is acceptable on non-moral 
grounds. 
 Seeing the emotional experience of anger as distinct from the angry actions which might 
follow allows us to argue that there are types of acceptable anger which are not morally justified. 
This also allows us to argue that all anger is not resentment. This distinction allows us to support the 
Nietzschean critique of resentment, without becoming anger-teetotalers like the proponents of the 
Stoic view. And, it helps us to explain why anger that the Justice account would say is morally 
unjustified is nonetheless acceptable.  
 Using this distinction allows us to see that anger itself is not an exclusively moral emotion, 
even though we can and ought to have a robust moral conversation about how we respond to our 
anger when it happens. We should avoid resentment and we should avoid acting out in anger against 
others.40 We ought to debate whether there are ever cases where an angry action is morally 
appropriate. We ought to debate whether there are ever cases where the force of anger itself is so 
strong that it excuses whatever angry action might follow.41 
 Even if we admit that anger ought to be considered separately from the actions it inspires, is 
there good reason to still follow the Stoic view in advocating for us not to be angry in the first place 
 
40 I tend to agree with Nussbaum that angry actions are unproductive and unhelpful when responding to many 
situations. In her words, “life is too short.” I am open to considering a narrow set of cases in which angry action might 
accomplish something unique. Again, however, this is a debate about how we act in response to anger, not about 
whether or not we ought to be angry in the first place. Nussbaum, Anger and Forgiveness, 92. 
 
41 For example, consider the long debates in legal studies about whether people can be held responsible for “crimes of 
passion” when they are suddenly provoked. There are good reasons to reject provocation as an excuse. See Canan 
Muftuler and Meltem Muftuler-Bac, “Provocation Defence for Femicide in Turkey: The Interplay of Legal 






given the often harmful after-effects? Or to follow the Justice view in permitting only justifiable 
anger as acceptable? If anger is powerful and can lead to wrong actions, then why spend 
philosophical energy making a case for why it is acceptable to experience? In the next section, I 











5.  Vitalist Account of Anger 
 
 In this section, I argue that anger is a vital part of the human emotional experience and that 
we should embrace it along with the full range of human emotion as part of living a meaningful life. 
The Stoic call to avoid all anger asks us to shape ourselves such that we are never angry. The Justice 
call to avoid all non-moral anger asks us to shape ourselves such that we are only angry when 
someone has done us moral harm. Both of these views miss out on understanding how anger is a 
vital emotional experience, even when it is morally unjustified, and both views conflate the 
experience of anger with anger’s frequent aftereffects.42 
 Consider a case of non-moral anger: you are walking across campus on your way to an 
important meeting, and you’ve put considerable effort into looking polished and professional. Most 
of the time you keep your appearance pretty simple, but you put extra effort in today because you 
care a lot about this meeting and you want to make a good impression. On your way, a pop-up 
rainstorm catches you off-guard and you are completely soaked. Your hair is messed up, maybe your 
makeup starts to run, and your nicely ironed clothes are now drenched. You experience a flash of 
anger—of all the days when your outfit has to be soaked, why did it need to be today, when you 
actually cared?43 
 
42 The view that anger expresses moral value is well established, like in cases of needing to express the wrong caused by 
some moral harm. See Kauppinen. However, I argue that all anger is an expression of the value of life, even in cases 
where moral or normative concerns are not operative. Antti Kauppinen, “Valuing Anger,” in The Moral Psychology of 
Anger, ed. Myisha V. Cherry and Owen J. Flanagan, Moral Psychology of the Emotions (London; New York: Rowman & 
Littlefield International, 2018), 31–48. 
 





 The Stoic view would say this flash of anger is inappropriate—you ought to become the type 
of serene person who is not bothered by things like this, who merely accepts them and moves 
forward. You shouldn’t allow yourself to waste your energy on things which are out of your control. 
The Justice view would say this flash of anger is inappropriate too—no moral harm has occurred 
and no one has done any wrong. It would be wrong to be angry at yourself or to take out your anger 
on anyone else. However, my vitalist view holds that anger is an essential human response that 
indicates that we truly care about something. Not only can we understand in a straightforward, 
common sense way that a frustrating situation might cause anger, but we can endorse anger as a 
healthy, appropriate response when something of importance goes awry.  
 On this account, we can interpret similar cases of non-moral anger as expressions of 
personal investment. Being active in shaping your life and getting to a place where you embrace your 
life as well-worth living requires caring that your plans go well. It is natural to be upset when our 
plans do not go well. On this view, anger is an expression of agency. You want to control your 
circumstances and shape the world and your life according to your plans. You reject passivity about 
your circumstances and make active life choices. Anger is valuable in this situation because it reflects 
that you care deeply about what is going on. This meeting is part of your plans and you have been 
thwarted in one of the steps you took to prepare well for it. Being upset indicates that you are 
engaging the world and that you are an agent who interacts with your circumstances. Anger is a vital 
response when things are frustrating. 
 This vitalist account accomplishes more than showing that anger is not uniquely 
unacceptable among the emotions, as the Stoic or Justice views might claim. It does show that anger 
is acceptable under a lot of non-moral circumstances. Importantly, however, it also shows that a 
person who is not angry sometimes is probably missing out on something—caring strongly about 





Anger is not merely an acceptable emotion under a broad set of non-moral experiences, rather it is 
also a vital emotion.  
 On the rainy day, you might quickly move past the anger and shake it off, and that would 
probably be a healthy response. Sometimes things happen that we cannot control. Out of all the bad 
things in the world, this sudden rain storm is a pretty low stakes event. People will be understanding 
about your appearance. It is a sign of resilience and personal strength when you can quickly move 
past a set-back. Instead of letting the rain ruin your meeting, or throw you off, you might decide to 
laugh it off and move on. It wouldn’t be helpful or productive for you to remain angry for long.  
 Just as we would recognize your anger as an understandable sign that you care strongly about 
your project, we can recognize you quickly moving past the anger as a resilient response. But this 
resilient response does not mean that the anger in the first place was wrong or misguided, 
inappropriate or unacceptable. Rather, the anger showed that your life matters to you and that you 
take yourself to have agency in response to your world. When things interfere with your plans, those 
interferences come with emotional stakes. Embracing your life requires sometimes being upset when 
it doesn’t go well. Of course, not all frustration results in anger. But there is something about having 
legitimate expectations that something will go well, along with hope and desire for a certain 
outcome, and then having something go wrong unexpectedly that is uniquely frustrating. The 
thwarted expectations and the suddenness of the disappointment are key elements for this kind of 
non-moral anger that follows frustration. 
 I think there are likely cases of non-moral anger subsequent to frustration which might seem 
trivial. You might object to my account of frustration-anger by saying that it all sounds like too 
much overreacting. Am I really advocating that we endorse non-moral anger over trivial things? If a 





crop of blooming dandelions everywhere, we can imagine anger.44 I argue that even in a case of a 
trivial trigger (we might say that lawns in suburbia do not matter very much!), we should still endorse 
anger, in part because of how we can imbue meaning to small things. To you, the objecting outsider, 
being angry about the dandelions is trite. But who knows what those dandelions might represent? 
Or, more simply, who knows whether this anger is an instance of sublimation, where anger about 
something much more serious gets channeled into lawn maintenance? Of course, you do not have to 
be angry about dandelions. But if you find yourself to be angry, that is fine.  
 Now, if anger is such a vital part of life, should we try to be more angry? Or should we 
celebrate all anger indiscriminately? No—anger is still something to be careful about. There probably 
is a healthy anger range of some sort. In a depressed person, you might find symptoms of not caring 
about things, and that lack of intense emotional experience might be a reason to worry about 
wellbeing. And in someone who is frequently angry, we might worry that it might be a sign of having 
constantly frustrated agency. If the circumstances in a person’s life are constantly making it hard to 
enact meaningful projects, then having too much anger is an expression of being trapped by 
circumstance. In this case, the answer is not “try to be less angry” but rather is something about 
attempting to change the scenario or adjust expectations.  
 We should not cast vital life experiences like anger in strictly moral terms. And, we should 
thoroughly examine the non-moral dimensions of value for our emotional experiences. But, we can 
still discuss how we respond to anger. The vitalist response to anger will not admonish you to 
become the sort of person who is never angry, or who is only angry under certain carefully defined 












6.  Responding to Anger 
 
 I’ve argued that anger is a vital part of a full human life and that we should not adopt a 
stance of anger-elimination. However, critics of anger are right to be wary of its frequently harmful 
consequences. So, if anger is vital, how can we embrace it while yet avoiding the harms it can often 
lead to? Part of making the case for anger requires giving an account of why it is not just better to 
avoid anger all together. It must be possible to recognize and mitigate the harmful aftereffects, even 
as we see the good role of anger in our lives. 
 I’ll explain how to handle anger by drawing on Nietzsche again. Are there non-moral norms 
or constraints about when anger is appropriate? How should we handle anger when we experience 
it? How do we avoid harmful resentment? We can look back to Nietzsche to develop a fuller picture 
of what a vitalist approach to anger looks like, to give some constraints about when it is appropriate, 
to know how to respond when we experience it. Nietzsche gives an account of anger where it is 
neither a human failing that it would be better to do without (the Stoic view), nor is it a morally 
important attitude which has strict moral conditions around when it rightly activates (the Justice 
view). Rather, anger is an energetic sign of life. 
 Consider Nietzsche’s discussion of ressentiment and the noble man in the Genealogy. He 
explains that cleverness is a feature of those defined by ressentiment, whereas the defining feature of 
noble men is the following:  
“perfect functioning of the regulating unconscious instincts or even than a certain 
imprudence, perhaps a bold recklessness whether in the face of danger or of the enemy, or 
that enthusiastic impulsiveness in anger, love, reverence, gratitude, and revenge, by which 
noble souls have at all times recognized one another. Ressentiment itself, if it should appear in 





does not poison: on the other hand, it fails to appear at all on countless occasions on which 
it inevitably appears in the weak and impotent.”45 
 
 I will make a few points about Nietzsche’s emotional noble man, which he presents as a 
contrast to one who is defined by ressentiment. First, it is not the case that the noble man does not 
experience anger. He faces enemies and experiences anger and desire for revenge. And he has such 
experiences intensely—with “enthusiastic impulsiveness” and “bold recklessness.” So not only does 
he experience anger, but he experiences intense anger that is hot and fast-burning. This anger comes 
quickly and intensely and passes just as quickly because he immediately responds to it in some way. 
For our vitalist account, you definitely experience anger, probably quite strongly sometimes. Anger is 
vital and indicates that you are living with a level of care about your life.  
 Second, appropriate experiences of anger do not sour or “poison” by turning into 
ressentiment. Bitterness, sour vengefulness, and resentment do not take root because the response to 
anger is not turning towards a ruminating “cleverness” but rather is in dealing with the “unconscious 
instincts.” Cleverness captures the kind of thinking and reasoning that can follow the perception of 
a slight. The hyper-focused turning over and analyzing of events where someone contemplates at 
length about how to handle the anger, or about whether it is justified, is what results in the anger of 
ressentiment, especially in cases where someone lacks any capacity to directly address the source of the 
slight or frustration. For the noble man, the response to anger deals with things on the level of 
instinct and emotion, so it is a quick and passing response to something that happens.  
 For the vitalist account, you avoid resentment by quickly moving past anger by using an 
immediate response. Nietzsche’s noble man experiences anger and then acts directly, with a quick 
beeline from emotion to an expression of agency, but without letting the anger fester and consume 
him. This relief of your anger can look like a quick direct action to resolve your situation 
 





immediately or to express your anger, which might be appropriate. For example, if your spouse says 
something hurtful or unkind to you, you might feel anger and quickly respond with a fierce glare, or 
by saying something like, “That was completely uncalled for! How could you even say that?”46 Or, 
quickly relieving your anger can also look like turning the energy towards another project which can 
absorb it. But either way, you accept and respond to the emotional response.  
 We see a version of this quick response to anger when we admit to ourselves that we need to 
step away from an angering situation to “catch our breath,” “cool down,” or “blow off some 
steam.” We recognize that we are experiencing anger and that an outlet for it is important. Instead 
of lashing out at the person we are with, or acting in a way that escalates a situation, we redirect the 
anger elsewhere. Often, you might “blow off some steam” by engaging in some kind of physical 
activity to channel the physiological surge of energy into something else—you might go for a run, or 
shoot some hoops, or aggressively clean something.47 Giving anger an outlet in these ways allows 
you to experience the emotion without stifling it or feeling morally bad about having it. Rather than 
stewing on or internalizing anger and creating resentment, you accept the emotion and take some 
kind of action in response. 
 Consider another type of non-moral anger where a quick response is merited. No-good-
reason anger happens when you are short tempered because you are hungry, hot, or tired. You 
might find yourself having a strong emotional reaction, like anger, in a situation where there is no 
 
46 You might also respond with something vengeful or violent. On Nietzsche’s view, the immediate response is the key 
part. I think there is plenty of room for us to say you should respond in a non-violent and respectful way. However, I 
argue that there are non-violent, respectful ways to express your anger to the other person that allows you the fullness of 
a vital response to your emotion, without requiring you to harm them. Communicating your anger quickly and directly 
allows you to respond to it, but does not have to be a morally harmful act. But it is better to quickly respond to your 
anger, whether or not that looks like communicating it to the other person. The thing to avoid on a Nietzschean account 
is allowing the anger to fester into resentment and bitterness.   
 
47 This type of behavior is sublimation in behavioral psychology. Freud thought it could be an unconscious channeling 
of emotional energy into socially acceptable behavior, but of course emotional outlets can be consciously chosen as well. 






good reason to be angry. In these cases, anger is in large part a physiological experience. Your body 
is under stress and your emotional capacity might express that stress through anger. Addressing 
anger looks like moving through it quickly, by taking care of your physical need and eating 
something, getting some rest, or cooling down.  
 Quickly relieving your anger can also look like channeling it into a related project where you 
have a plan to enact your anger response when the right occasion arises. Sometimes a worthy and 
empowering action needs to planned and well-timed. You might immediately direct your anger into 
that project, even if the ultimate response action is delayed. For example, the Homeric heroes were 
not stewing schemers when they released their anger in the battlefield at Troy, even though there 
was a delay between the angering event and their reaction.48 They merely dealt with their anger by 
making a concrete plan and appointing a future date to address it. Again, if you find yourself angry 
with your spouse, you might choose to delay a verbal or facial reaction if you are in front of your in-
laws or your children, but you make a note to communicate in private at an appropriate moment. 
Importantly, you can avoid resentment if you can add the issue to your agenda, commit to 
addressing it appropriately, and then move on without dwelling on it in the meantime or letting it 
color your subsequent interactions. And neither the case of delaying a reaction by the Homeric 
heroes nor towards your spouse is vindictive, resentful down-ranking. Rather, both are cases of 
engaging an equal on the basis of shared standards of behavior. In cases like these, avoiding 
resentment looks like building towards another project that might not immediately unfold—the 
anger stops burning but the resulting action might be a while in the making. 
 So far, on the vitalist response to anger, you accept that you are experiencing the emotion 
and you move through it quickly by reacting in some way. Importantly, you don’t hold on to anger.  
 





You don’t engage in backwards-looking stewing or rumination or scheming, in the manner that 
Nietzsche calls “cleverness.” This “cleverness” sounds a lot like the backwards-looking project of 
the Justice view. When we spend a lot of time rehearsing to ourselves the feeling of anger, or 
chastising ourselves for feeling it in the first place, we are not moving past it quickly. 
 One implication of this vitalist account is that you develop a much higher threshold for what 
qualifies as an anger-provoking experience. This is a kind of slowness to anger, not from weakness 
or meekness, but because you are not easily angered as you aren’t prone to seeing the world through 
the lens of resentment. For Nietzsche, the anger of the noble man will not occur at all in some cases. 
At first, this lack of anger sounds like Nussbaum’s search among nonviolent activists for the secrets 
of non-anger. However, I do not think the correct way to read Nietzsche is as a claim about the 
greater tolerance for frustration of a careful sage who has conditioned himself not to respond with 
strong emotion. Rather, I think ressentiment conditions you to seek out reasons for anger where they 
do not exist.  
 We see this contrast between the noble man and the resentful one spelled out further in 
terms of forgiveness. For Nietzsche, the opposite of ressentiment is having a “strong, full nature,” 
such that one is “incapable of taking one’s enemies, one’s accidents, even one’s misdeeds seriously 
for very long” and looks like having “no memory for insults and vile actions,” to “be unable to 
forgive simply because he forgot.”49 Forgiveness is a non-issue for the noble man, in part because he 
does not see his misfortunes through the serious eyes of resentment, and in part because he is not 
fueled by cleverness but action. He is too busy living to have a memory that focuses in on the slights 
and misfortunes he experiences. In order to stay focused on moving forward with his interests and 
projects, he cannot afford to linger in anger long enough for it to turn into resentment. So, the noble 
 





man quickly moves through anger and moves on. For Nietzsche, responding to anger looks like 
action, whereas responding to resentment looks like cleverness. 
 A vitalist response to anger is about action, not ruminating. And, it is it not shaped by 
looking through the cloudy lens of resentment. Once you are suspicious of someone, are angry with 
him, and are experiencing resentment, you are prone to interpret everything he does through the 
perspective of resentment. The noble man does not let anger define and overwhelm him by turning 
into resentment, so he is not prone to framing everything as a situation where anger might be 
warranted. The set of life situations and interactions with others which invoke the noble man’s anger 
is smaller than the set for the person fueled by resentment. Resentment changes your worldview 
such that many things become slights or frustrations which would not have originally provoked your 
anger. Importantly, the vitalist is not emotionless or haughtily perceiving herself to be above the 
fray, such that she is never angry when others think she ought to be, or such that she is dismissive of 
the anger of others. Because the vitalist knows the value of her own emotions, she acknowledges the 
anger of others as vital too.  
 We can see this implication of slowness to anger as beneficial for prudential reasons as well. 
It is normal to wish we weren’t so quickly angered, or to think that being angry too frequently is 
exhausting, or to think that we shouldn’t overreact by being extremely furious over only small 
things. If anger is a vital part of our lives, we might think there are norms for what it looks like to be 
working at its best, even if these are not moral norms about avoiding or justifying anger. Avoiding 
resentment by being vitalist about anger can help to address these prudential worries. 
 I have argued that there is something weird and undesirable about a life without anger. So 
too is there something undesirable about a life filled only with anger. Even if you avoid resentment 
and only experience raw anger which you quickly move through, we might still think it worthwhile 





experience anger too frequently. You don’t want to eliminate it from your life completely, as it is a 
valuable part of your emotional experience. But, you might want there to be sufficient room for 
other emotional experiences as well, such that you work to not have anger as your dominant 
emotion. Of course a lot might depend on your situation. If you are under constant duress, or facing 
an onslaught of grief or loss, we can understand how anger might be your dominant emotion for a 
while. 
 It is important about who we are that we feel the full range of our emotions. Responding to 
the world robustly and living fully means that sometimes those emotions might be quite intense, or 
might lead us to do things we’d rather not do. But those intensities or undesired consequences are 
not reasons to avoid the emotion entirely.  
 Consider your capacity for tasting sweetness.50 Most people who can taste sweetness really 
enjoy eating sweet things from time to time. If you are trying to avoid eating too many sugary things 
for some reason, you might try to avoid eating a lot of desserts, or drinking sodas, or having sweet 
snacks. However, we would think it very odd if you tried to lose your capacity for enjoying 
sweetness altogether. Even if it were biologically possible to turn off your brain’s recognition for 
sweetness, my intuition is that it would be very sad to willingly never experience sweetness again. We 
might think there is something disordered about trying to remove your capacity for some experience 
as a means of avoiding the negative consequences of the experience. Just because appreciating 
sweetness can sometimes play a role on a path to serious health problems does not mean we should 
say a world without sweetness, or without our capacity to experience it, would be a better one.  
 Likewise for anger. Just because anger can sometimes lead to serious consequences does not 
mean that we should say a world without anger, or without our capacity to experience anger, would 
be a better one. In trying to refrain from angry actions that harm others, it seems odd as well to try 
 





to remove our capacity for anger. There is something so vital and human about being able to feel 
angry that we ought not to endorse moral views which rule it out, or which make legitimate 
experiences of anger into a rare exception to a rule against it. So far, I’ve emphasized how anger is 
an expression of valuing life and that genuinely caring about how your life goes means that you will 
be quite angry sometimes. But this analogy with sweetness brings out a more fundamental 
dimension of why anger is vital. Like sweetness, anger is part of the fabric of life that composes the 
richness of human experience. Even if anger were not a symptom of value, experiencing anger is 
something essential for being human. 
 Though it seems sad and undesirable to try to lose the capacity for sweetness altogether, it 
seems very reasonable to try to manage your capacity for sweetness. You might try to refine your 
palate to prefer natural sugars to artificial ones, or try to reduce sweetness’s sway over you, such that 
it is not a primary driver of your actions. You might avoid habits formed around the consumption of 
sugar, so as to avoid developing an addiction. So too with anger. Just because I am advocating that 
we embrace anger as a vital part of our lives does not mean that we ought to cease attempting to 
manage our anger or quit trying to handle anger in responsible ways. I argued that a vitalist response 
to anger requires quickly taking action to move past anger and that someone shaped by vitalist 










7.  Conclusion  
 
 The Stoic tradition warns that we ought to avoid all anger because of its many harms. The 
Justice tradition responds that we ought to make room for morally justified anger, but warns against 
unjustified anger because of its harms. I focused on cases of anger where moral justification has no 
place in order to show that there are non-moral cases of anger. I showed that anger is acceptable in 
non-moral cases as an expression of valuing life, in order to claim that all anger holds this vital place 
in our lives. We might be able to explain some anger in terms of morality, but on a more 
fundamental level, the anger is valuable as an expression of caring about how life goes. So, we can 
reject boundaries against unacceptable anger of both the Justice and Stoic traditions. Anger is a vital 
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